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Abstract
White (1996), Poyago-Theotoky (2001) and Myles (2002) prove that in the mixed oligopoly
the optimal subsidy, equilibrium output level, all firms' profits and social welfare are
identical irrespective of whether the public firm maximizes welfare or profit and moves
simultaneously with private firms, or maximizes welfare and acts as a Stackelberg leader.
They name this observation the `irrelevance result'. Previous results have assumed all firms
produce a homogeneous product with quantity as the strategic variable. We show that the
irrelevance result extends to product differentiation and to Bertrand competition with price as
the strategic variable.
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In recent years mixed oligopoly models have received a growing interest in
economic theory. These models assume that the public ￿rm maximizes so-
cial welfare, de￿ned as the sum of consumer surplus and ￿rm pro￿ts minus
subsidy, while private ￿rms maximize pro￿t. The main focus has been the
consequences of privatisation of the public ￿rm. Early studies, e.g. DeFraja
and Delbono (1989), show that privatisation of the public ￿rm is desirable
in terms of social welfare. On the other hand, White (1996) proves that
this result is not always true. In an oligopolistic framework, White (1996)
showed that, in the case of government intervention in the mixed oligopoly
market by using an optimal output subsidy, privatisation of the public ￿rm
is ine⁄ective because under the optimal output subsidy, ￿rms￿output and
pro￿t and social welfare are identical both before and after privatisation of
the public ￿rm. Poyago-Theotoku (2001) shows that the optimal output
subsidy is identical and pro￿ts, output and social welfare are also identical
irrespective of whether (i) the public ￿rm moves simultaneously with private
￿rms or (ii) it acts as a Stackelberg leader or (iii) all ￿rms, public and private,
behave as pro￿t-maximizers. Myles (2002) extends the irrelevance result of
Poyago-Theotoky from linear inverse demand to general inverse demand and
cost functions.
So far almost all of the literature has assumed Cournot (quantity) com-
petition with a homogeneous product. It is hence important to consider
whether the conclusions drawn remain valid under alternative assumptions.
Our main conclusion is that that the irrelevance result applies even with
product di⁄erentiation, and also extends to Bertrand (price) competition. It
is therefore signi￿cantly more general than previously suspected.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a general frame-
work of a mixed oligopoly market for di⁄erentiated products and Cournot
competition and Section 3 examines the analysis for Bertrand competition.
Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Cournot Competition With Di⁄erentiated
Goods
Di⁄erentiated goods, labeled by i = 0;1;:::n, are each produced by one
￿rm. Firm 0 is a public ￿rm, and the rest are private. We consider the social
1optimum and the market equilibrium outcomes before and after privatisation
of the public ￿rm. There is one consumer. The inverse demands and the
direct demands are:














Note that these demand functions permit homogeneous products as a spe-
cial case. In the previous literature it was assumed that the ￿rms produce
a homogeneous good, and the welfare measure was de￿ned as the sum of
consumer surplus and ￿rms￿pro￿ts less subsidy costs. Note that with many
di⁄erentiated goods consumer surplus is not generally well-de￿ned. If there is
no cross-price e⁄ect in the demand functions one can arguably use the sum of
consumer surpluses for individual goods as the total consumer surplus. This,
however, is not an appropriate welfare measure when cross-price e⁄ects are
present. Instead, the indirect utility function can be used.
The consumer owns the private ￿rms. The consumer, as a government,
owns the public ￿rm and pays out subsidies to the ￿rms. Total income is
de￿ned as a lump-sum income plus total pro￿ts less total subsidies





where the pro￿ts are
￿i = piqi ￿ Ci (qi) + siqi:
The indirect utility function is












[piqi ￿ Ci (qi)]
￿
:
We assume that this function is di⁄erentiable.
In the social optimum the quantities are chosen to maximize the indirect























= 0; i = 0;:::n; (1)
















i); i = 0;:::n: (2)
It is assumed that this set of equations has a unique solution.
2.1 Mixed and Private Cournot-Nash Oligopoly
In the mixed Cournot oligopoly ￿rm 0 chooses q0 to maximize indirect utility,
and ￿rms i = 1;:::n choose qi to maximize their pro￿t. The ￿rst-order









































i (qi) + si; i = 1;:::n: (3)









; i = 1;:::n; (4)
results in the socially-optimal outcome (2).
After privatisation all ￿rms maximize their pro￿ts by choosing outputs.








i as de￿ned in (4) to ￿rms i = 1;:::n.
32.2 Mixed Cournot-Stackelberg Oligopoly






















































where ￿rm k￿ s reaction function
@qk
@q0












































































This results in the socially-optimal outcome if the optimal subsidy (4) is
given to the private ￿rms.
Hence we have proved that the irrelevance result holds with di⁄erentiated
goods for Cournot-Nash mixed and private duopoly cases, and it also holds
when the public ￿rm is a leader in Cournot-Stackelberg duopoly.
43 Bertrand Competition With Di⁄erentiated
Goods
The socially-optimal equilibrium is the same regardless of the choice vari-































; i = 0;:::n;















; i = 0;:::n;
which is the same as (2) given the assumptions on the direct demand func-
tions.
3.1 Mixed and Private Bertrand-Nash Oligopoly
In the mixed Bertrand oligopoly ￿rm 0 chooses p0 to maximize indirect utility,
and ￿rms i = 1;:::n choose pi to maximize their pro￿t. The ￿rst-order

































= 0; i = 1;:::n:









￿; i = 1;:::n; (6)
5and using Roy￿ s identity in (5) for the equilibrium we obtain (2).
After privatisation all ￿rms maximize their pro￿ts by choosing outputs,








i as de￿ned in (6) to ￿rms i = 1;:::n.
3.2 Mixed Bertrand-Stackelberg Oligopoly






























































































and using Roy￿ s identity for the equilibrium, with subsidies (6) we obtain the
socially-optimal outcome.











This paper has demonstrated that under the optimal subsidy, all ￿rms￿prof-
its, prices, output and welfare are identical regardless of the nature of the
competition. Our ￿nding has been obtained for the general demand and cost
functions, and for an arbitrary number of di⁄erentiated goods. The irrele-
vance result therefore extends well beyond the original setting of quantity
competition with homogeneous products.
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